such as waiting rooms railway carriages post-office counters washrooms etc. located in areas inhabited by members of several racial groups Meso-segregation i.e the physical separation resulting from the existence of racially homogeneous residential ghettoes within multi racial urban areas Macro-segregation i.e the segregation of racial groups discrete territorial units such as the Native Reserves of South Africa now being restyled as Bantustans
The above distinction however is not only one of degree but also of kind Each form of segregation ful nis dînèrent purposes from the viewpoint of the ruling albinocracy and entails different consequences for South African society as whole Let us urst examine the gains of the White group from the various forms of segregation then analyze the internal contradictions inherent in macro-segregation and finally turn to the differential economic effects of the three types of racial separation It is often said that the apartheid policies of the present Afrikaner Nationalist government constitute simply more systematic and intensified version of traditonal practices of racial discrimination and segregation This statement is true in the sense that large scale imple mentation of all three kinds of segregation extends at least as far back as the 19th century However in recent years the Nationalist govern ment has increasingly stressed macro-segregation There are two apparent reasons why this should be the case First if one accepts the premises that interracial contact promotes conflict and that apartheid is the only salvation for the albinocracy then it follows that maximization of physical distance between racial groups is desirable Second macro-segregation in the form of the Bantustan policy can be presented for purposes of international apologetics as an attempt at equitable partition between separate but equal nations within happy commonwealth Indeed favorite argument of the apostles of apartheid is that their policy substitutes vertical nonhierarchical barriers between ethnic groups for horizontal dis criminatory color bar Beyond these obvious considerations this shift of emphasis in the implementation of apartheid from micro-to macro-segregation is motiv ated by more basic factors To be sure micro-segregation is still as rigidly enforced as ever before but not with the same order of priority Micro-segregation with grossly unequal facilities is constant symbol of the racial status hierarchy and is source of emotional gratification economic advantages and other practical conveniences for the White group Substantial as the gains accruing ironi micro-segregation for the Whites are however this aspect of apartheid is luxury in the sense that it contributes little to the maintenance of White supre macy and that it further exacerbates the non-White masses The Portuguese for example still maintain their rule in Angola and Mozambique without any resort to legal micro-segregation thus claiming to be free of racial prejudice similarly the White-settler regime of Rhodesia has gone some way toward the elimination of microsegregation without in any way jeopardizing its power monopoly. The preservation of micro-segregation in South Africa serves mostly to indulge the phobia of racial pollution but micro-segre gation is definitely not cornerstone of the socio-political order Meso-segregation i.e the maintenance of racial ghettoes arose in the igth century as way of making the non-White helotry as invi sible as possible to the Herrenvolk and of preserving the latter from the moral and physical contamination of congested unhygienic slums The presence of many domestic servants living on their employers premises however made most White sections of towns de facto interracial
In addition these were number of racially mixed residential areas in Cape Town Durban Johannesburg and many smaller cities When the Nationalists came to power in 1948 they proceeded to make meso-segregation as impermeable as possible through the policy of Group Areas Tens of thousands of people were expropriated expelled from their domiciles and relocated according to their pig mentation Even the number of non-White domestic servants allowed to live with their White employers was sharply reduced distinct departure from earlier practices The enforcement of meso-segrega tion involves many hardships for non-Whites threatens much of the Indian and Coloured middle class with economic ruin and entails considerable profits for many thousands of Whites But beyond these side effects the complete ghettoization of South African cities is ostensibly being promoted as cornerstone in the maintenance of the status quo
The presence of millions of non-Whites in cities is deplored by the government but reluctantly accepted as an economic necessity Given the latter the government endeavors to enforce new style of rigid meso-segregation in great part for reasons of internal security With mounting unrest among Africans military and police control become increasingly crucial
The older non-W hite shantytowns with their maze of narrow tortuous alleys were often located close to White residential or business districts they are now systematically being razed as major military hazard They are being replaced with model townships with unobstructed rectilinear fields of fire and wide streets for the passage of police vans and armored cars The new ghettoes are typically situated several miles from the White towns with buffer zone in between they are sprinkled with strategically located police stations and often enclosed by barbed wire Macro-segregation because of its many practical and ideological implications is perhaps the most interesting aspect of Nationalist racial policy and hence deserves closer attention1
Total territorial separation is the avowed ideal which apartheid seeks to achieve for all racial groups
Ideally the government would like to cram the eleven million Africans into the impoverished eroded and entirely rural Native Reserves which constitute thirteen per cent of the territory The rest of the country would then acquire pristine white purity While the government realizes that this aim is utopian it is nevertheless implementing an elaborate scheme the so-called Bantus tan policy to keep as large percentage of Africans as possible in these rural slums Africans deemed to be redundant in the White areas are constantly being endorsed out of them and sent to their Bantu homelands
The Bantustans have several obvious security advantages they are relatively isolated dispersed ethnically homo geneous distant from the White cities and devoid of any urban concentrations of more than few thousand people and communica tion within and between them is difficult In its basic conception the Bantustan policy of the South African government is not new
Interpretations of its real intention vary but the limits of actual variability in implementation which the govern ment is prepared to tolerate can be determined with fair degree of precision In minimum. form the Bantustans are revamping of the Native Reserves along the following main lines Geographical segregation of as many Africans as possible from non-Africans and of specific African ethnic groups from each other Pretoria-sponsored cultural revivalism and the elaboration of pseudo-traditional authority structures An extension of the sphere of local autonomy under the autho rity of government-appointed chiefs which in effect amounts to shift from direct to indirect rule Leo Kuper gives vivid description of the minimum Bantustan scheme as it is presently being implemented The policy is to retribalize Africans and to fragment them into separate tribal entities self-policed introspectively detached from each other and from the White world and self-perpetuated by the insemination of tribal ardor1
In this sense the Bantustan concept amounts to the transforma tion of the South African colonial empire from an internal one as ana lyzed by Leo Marquard2 to an external one the Native Reserves are being restyled into semi-autonomous puppet states or protectorates under quasi-traditional aristocracy At the other end of the tolerable spectrum from the viewpoint is the maximum notion of Bantustans as separate Black States While this alternative is clearly distasteful to the govern ment it was being envisaged as early as 1961 as possible line of retreat in response to external and internal pressures Thus Prime Minister Verweerd said in reaction to this possibility This is not what we would have preferred to see This is form of fragmentation which we would rather not have had if it was within our control to avoid it3
Even under nominal political sovereignty the Nationa list government counts on the ethnic division small size and utter economic dependence of the Bantustans to maintain them in colonial relationship Developments in the High Commission Territories the near future may provide reasonably good predictors of the possible political behavior of the independent Bantustans and thus indirectly influence Nationalist policies
The basic question concerning the future of the Bantustans and indeed of the Republic as whole then becomes Will the government be able to contain the Bantustan scheme within these fairly narrow limits My argument is that it will not in part because of interna tional pressures in part because of mounting conflicts in the White areas of the Republic and lastly because of the dialectic unleashed by contradictions within the Bantustan scheme itself We shall focus here on this last point There are four major aspects to the contradictions evident in the Bantustan policy all of these are to large degree unanticipated consequences of that policy and threaten to make its implementation in the Transkei the opening of box from the point of view However the magic word has been spoken partly no doubt as carrot to the collaborationist African chiefs and perhaps also on the assumption that the statement would be taken at face value by some leaders of Western powers on the non-intervention of which the future of apartheid hinges to consider able degree It seems likely that the independence pronouncement however vague will exacerbate or even create rather than mollify opposition There are already signs that this is happening in two opposite ways The strategy of many African chiefs who have decided to further their power and pursue their interests within the Bantustan framework is to exert whatever pressure they can against the government in terms of the avowed goal of independence This most cautious form of subversion from within involves little danger to its advocates since it is couched in government rhetoric and ostensibly follows govern ment logic
The sheer use of the term independence represents retreat if only verbal one on the part of the government and it is the nature of tightly oppressive regimes that concessions easily lead to an escalation of demands as already shown by several tremors of protest among Transkeian chiefs
The rhetoric of independence has also opened up new avenue of opposition to government policy Unlikely as this may have seemed until 1961 Verwoerd is now under attack from the right both from the rural platteland elements within his own party and from the United Party
The latter particular claims to accept the independence pronouncements at face value and takes the government to task for partitioning the Republic and creating hostile black States in its midst Consequently the government faces an interesting dilemma On the one hand if it refuses to transfer sovereignty to the Bantustans the latter will be exposed more and more clearly as elaborate shams and this may even precipitate revolt of the puppet chiefs On the other hand should Verweerd take definite steps towards granting political independence to the Transkei and other future Bantustans he must face the danger of losing the support of his reactionary Afrikaner electorate
The second contradiction the Bantustan scheme is somewhat related to the first It concerns the extension of universal adult franchise to Africans of the Xhosa and Sothö groups who live in the Transkei or whose theoretical homeland is supposed to be located therein The government may have assumed that the cathartic effect of casting ballot would reduce the hostility of Africans and that this franchise would meet demands for one-man-one-vote It is clear however that few Africans are satisfied with virtually meaningless voting rights which entitle some ethnic groups to elect minority of members in Legislative Assembly which is itself subject to veto and the jurisdiction of which is restricted to only some of the people living in 3.2 per cent of the territory If anything it seems probable that the exercise of an ineffective franchise heightens the level of discontent What can be more frustrating than to be allowed to express hostility to apartheid only to witness the forcible establishment during state of emergency of self-govern ment led by appointed chiefs whose position was overwhelmingly defeated at the polls In this respect the Transkei scheme is fundamentally different from Fascist-type regime where ritualistic plebiscites propaganda mass rallies and the like are used to create the illusion of consensus
In the Transkei Africans have been allowed to express their strong opposi tion to apartheid at the polls only to see their views disregarded and overridden Thise use of the franchise seems to maximize discontent in that it reflects the contempt for African opinion
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Implicitly the latter is regarded as so inconsequential as not even to be worthy of concerted propaganda effort to sell apartheid1
The third and perhaps most interesting contradiction in the Ban tustan scheme concerns the stand on the racial issue taken respectively by the collaborators and those in opposition
Ironically the oppo nents of apartheid as represented by Victor Poto take what is osten sibly pro-White position They protest against the plan to make the Transkei an exclusively black State and favor multi-racialism with equal opportunities and rights to all including whites Con versely the collaborating chiefs under the leadership of Kaiser Matanzima express their uneasy agreement with apartheid by raising the thinly veiled spectre of anti-whiteism Since apartheid is the product of white racism it is not surprising that it calls forth black counter-racism
The latter is of course repressed by the South African government when it takes militant nationalist form as in the Pan-African Congress However black racism can also be couched in apartheid phraseology and take the form of extolling narrow ethnic nationalism and giving vent to xenophobia Indeed there is no safer way for an African to express his hostility to Whites than to make use of the official hate ideology
The govern ment keeps warning Africans of outside hyenas and jackals who come to exploit or deceive them it tells them what noble savages they are so long as they do not let themselves be spoiled by Western culture etc Thus apartheid and the Bantustan concept can easily become latent platforms for surreptitious and insidious variety of ethnic par ticularism and antiwhiteism Such is interpretation of the Transkeian Chief motives cold haughty man who nurses an enmity towards Whites and wishes to escape their oppressive pre sence Matanzima has chosen to try to do this by using apartheid 2
The fourth contradiction inherent in the Bantustans is the most basic of all and indeed underlies the other three Both the practica bility of the Bantustans and their acceptability to sufficient numbers of Africans hinge on massive redistribution of wealth and power at the expense of the albinocracy3
More specifically the economic This is but one of several ways in which South Africa differs from Fascist-type regime See VAN DEN BERGHE op cit. for more extensive treat ment of this point Bunting on the other hand stresses and indeed overstresses the similarities of South Africa with Nazi Germany See BUNTING op cit The Southern United States constitute closer parallel to South Africa than does Nazi Germany Fascist Italy or Spain Govan MBEKI South Africa The Revolt Baltimore 1964 137 Although the vast majority of African leaders have rejected the partition of South Africa on any terms there have been few dissenting voices E.g viability of partition in South Africa depends on the manifold enlarge ment of the African and indeed other non-White areas on the largescale subsidization of subsistence agriculture by the money sector of the economy and consequently on drastic land and income redistribu tion Politically if the partitioned areas are to retain any federal association the basis of such association must clearly be an effective sharing of power between the constituent racial groups in the joint government rather than the Bantustan blueprint of White colonial state dominating half-dozen or more labor reservoirs administered by puppet chiefs
However it is obvious that these necessary conditions to any viable partition scheme are precisely those which the Nationalist government desperately seeks to avert through its Bantustan scheme
The latter is apparently based on the assumption or the hope that Africans and the outside world are mistaking the comic opera of equality and the shadow of economic development for the real things
The Bantustan scheme is thus in part an ineffective attempt to mollify internal and external opposition at minimal cost to the ruling caste and in part blueprint for the improvement of the repressive apparatus
All four paradoxes or contradictions in Bantustan policy which we have brieny examined raise doubt as to the ability to control latest litter of feral children In summary apartheid aims to introduce between racial groups the greatest degree of physical separation consistent with economic imperatives in highly industrialized society Macro-segregation is deemed by the government to offer the greatest chance of continued White supremacy but where White industry mining and agriculture require non-White labor lesser degrees of segregation are acceptable
The last aspect of our analysis concerns the differential economic consequences of micro-meso-and macro-segregation Many ana lysts of the South African scene have observed that apartheid involves great economic cost and interferes with economic development Apartheid certainly conflicts with principles of economic rationality and government policies often assign priority to political as opposed to economic aims Directly and indirectly the economic cost of apar theid is no lesser for being difficult to assess with any degree of preci sion However the three degrees of segregation have different effects and entail different economic costs Jordan Ngubane has advocated an ethnic confederation accompanied by drastic land reform Cf his book An African Explains Apartheid New York 1963 pp 220-232 Micro-segregation is certainly the least costly of the three Segre gated non-White facilities are either vastly inferior to the White ones or altogether non-existent
To avoid any suggestion of separate but equal doctrine law was passed the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act providing for segregated and unequal facilities True duplication of public conveniences is highly exceptional and segrega tion often means nothing more than the exclusion of non-Whites from many places Thus micro-segregation frequently involves saving over what it would cost to provide adequate facilities for the entire population and there is little or no economic incentive for the White group to abolish it With the introduction of the new style of meso-segregation the government is deliberately paying an economic price for the mainten ance of White supremacy Much of that price however is not paid by the government but by the Africans who have to finance many of the amenities in their streamlined ghettoes and bear the cost of trans port to and from the White areas where they work
In addition White employers of non-White labor suffer indirectly from the lower labor efficiency resulting from employee fatigue and time wasted in transit Consequently while the total economic cost of ghettoization is quite high the direct price paid by the government and the bulk of the White electorate which votes for the Nationalists is relatively low Macro-segregation is potentially the most expensive for the govern ment
The sums required to subsidize economic development in the Bantustans in order to raise the standard of living above starvation would run into hundreds of millions of dollars But here again the government spends only small fraction of the necessary sum on the development of the Bantu homelands1
What the Bantustan policy does in effect achieve economically is to perpetuate the sharp dis tinction within the South African economy between high production money sector and D-subsistence one The productive potential of the one-third of the African population which is kept in or even forced back into the Reserves is thus vastly underutilized
In the same way as South Africa combines politically the properties of quasi-democracy for the Herrenvolk and colonial tyranny for the Africans economically the country is at once booming industrial nation and one of the most destitute of the underdeveloped countries From the above analysis it seems that all three levels of segregation on which the policy of apartheid rests are doomed to economic and political failure for combination of reasons Micro-segregation serves little purpose in the preservation of the status quo but also involves minimum of cost to the government Its major function is to provide bigoted albinocracy with some psychological and material fringe benefits of oppression Meso-segregation is considerably costlier but on it rests the political control of the highly explosive urban areas From the viewpoint of the maintenance of White supremacy meso-segregation is thus essen tial Only through the compartmentalization of racial groups into streamlined ghettoes can the dominant White minority hope to combat open insurgency
On the other hand the implementation of mesosegregation with the entire repressive machinery of reference books influx control job reservation population registration and group areas is directly responsible for the overwhelming majority of acts of protest and revolt against apartheid Thus the ghettoization of urban life brings with it the growing hypertrophy of the police and military apparatus Not only is the militarization of an ever-growing proportion of the White population expensive but its effectiveness is limited by at least two factors First the open and unrestrained use of military violence given the climate of world opinion threatens the government with outside intervention Second as the Whites mono polize all key positions in government industry transport communi cations etc. and as many Whites hold such key positions the simult aneous mobilization of the albinocracy on any sizeable scale would bring about considerable disruption of civilian activities not to mention the problem of the protection of dependents
In the foregoing analysis have tried to show that the continued enforcement of meso-and macro-segregation is essential to the preser vation of white supremacy However apartheid also generates conflicts and contradictions the control of which involves an everrising cost in economic human and military resources Micro-and meso-segregation in urban areas create an undercurrent of revolt precariously held in check by growing police and army apparatus and the Bantustan scheme unwittingly threatens to destroy the entire edifice of White supremacy
